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Supporting Permanently Affordable Housing 
in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program: 
An Analysis of State Qualified Allocation Plans 
Marla Nelson and Elizabeth Sorce      January 2013 
Abstract 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program is the country’s largest source of federal subsidy 
for affordable housing.  Since its inception, the program has financed more than 2.2 million housing 
units, accounting for about one-sixth of all rental housing in the country.1   Limited affordability periods, 
and the ability for property owners to “opt out” of the program after 15 years, have raised concerns 
about the loss of affordable units to market rate conversion, particularly in strong housing markets.  
Organizations that provide permanently affordable housing, often referred to as “shared equity” 
models, can ensure the affordability and stewardship of LIHTC housing in perpetuity and preserve 
public subsidies. In turn, the LIHTC program can more effectively utilize public dollars by funding the 
permanently affordable housing sector. Based on a review of Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) for all 
fifty states and Washington DC, this report identifies policies and preferences states have adopted to 
guide the allocation of LIHTC resources that can support permanently affordable housing.
1 Khadduri, Jill, Climaco, Carissa, Burnett, Kimberly, Gould, Laurie and Elving, Louise. 2012, August. What Happens to Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit Properties at Year 15 and Beyond? US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and Development Research.  
Retrieved August 7, 2012: http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/hsgfin/lihtc_report2012.html.
2What is Permanently Affordable 
Housing?
Permanently affordable housing (PAH) is housing that 
is affordable to low- and moderate-income households 
now and in the future.  The PAH sector includes both 
permanently affordable rental units and shared equity 
homeownership units. Shared equity homeownership 
models—including community land trusts (CLTs), 
limited equity cooperatives and long-term deed-
restricted housing programs—restrict the price 
for which a home is sold to the first lower income 
buyer and every subsequent lower income buyer 
to preserve affordability in perpetuity. Ultimately, 
these homeowners and the stewarding organization 
agree to share the rights, responsibilities, risks, and 
rewards of homeownership. In this report, non-profit 
and government organizations with shared equity 
homeownership programs are referred to as “PAH 
organizations.”
PAH organizations are committed to providing 
a continuum of housing options for low-income 
households.  They have an expertise in helping 
households attain and retain homeownership and, 
in the process, build the kind of transformational 
wealth that changes lives.  On the rental side, PAH 
organizations have provided low-income households 
with high-quality and affordable housing that allows 
them to realize residential stability and financial 
security. The PAH sector is able to achieve these 
results by equally emphasizing resident support 
services and quality housing design, construction, and 
management. The stewardship of homes and residents 
provided by PAH organizations ensures that: 1) high-
quality, well-maintained affordable housing benefits 
communities, and 2) lower income households realize 
positive outcomes from their tenure. 
What is the Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit?
Established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program 
provides market incentives for the development 
or rehabilitation of rental housing affordable to 
households with incomes equal to or less than 60 
percent of area median income (AMI). In its more than 
25 year history, LIHTC has become the largest program 
in the United States for affordable rental housing 
production, having helped fund the development of 
more than 2.2 million housing units.2 
 
The federal government annually issues tax credits 
to state housing finance agencies (HFAs) on a per-
capita basis. State HFAs allocate credits through a 
competitive process in accordance with their housing 
priorities articulated by their Qualified Allocation Plans 
(QAP), the principle document used to determine 
which housing developments receive tax credits 
during a given allocation period.3 Developers sell tax 
credits to investors in exchange for equity; investors 
in turn get ten years of tax credits based on the 
total development cost.4   The developer, or general 
partner, is responsible for managing the project, 
while the credit purchaser typically assumes a passive 
investment role.
Properties financed with tax credits must remain 
affordable to low-income households for 15 years 
from the date they are placed in service (Figure 1). 
Projects that fall out of compliance with low-income 
occupancy requirements are subject to tax credit 
recapture. Despite changes to the LIHTC program in 
1989 that extended the affordability period from 15 
to 30 years, year 15 remains a critical juncture in the 
life of LIHTC projects.  After the initial 15-year period, 
the obligation to report to the IRS on compliance 
issues ends. Hence, investors are no longer at risk 
of IRS penalties for failure to comply with program 
rules, and the HFA assumes sole responsibility for 
compliance monitoring.5  Additionally, an owner of a 
LIHTC property with a 30-year affordability restriction 
can opt out of the program in year 15 through the 
Qualified Contract (QC) process by requesting the HFA 
find a buyer committed to maintaining the property 
under the affordability restrictions.6  If no purchaser is 
found, affordability restrictions are phased out and the 
owner can reposition the units at market-rate. 
2 Ibid.
3 There are two types of LIHTCs—9% and 4% credits.  Only the 9% credits, 
which generate more equity, are awarded on a competitive basis through 
the QAP.  Four percent “as of right credits” are non-competitive and used in 
conjunction with bond financing.
4 The total amount of development cost eligible for generating LIHTC is 
the “eligible basis.” Eligible costs include all “hard” construction costs and 
most depreciable “soft” costs.  Land and building acquisition costs are not 
included in the eligible basis. For more information on the eligible basis and 
calculating tax credits see Enterprise Community Partners Introduction to 
LIHTC available at: http://www.enterprisecommunity.com/search-results?o-
Search=eligible+basis.
5 Ibid.
6 Transferring property to another owner will require additional costs. A 
nonprofit buyer will either have to secure additional grant funding or take 
on more debt, which can force up rents, reducing affordability and put the 
property at risk of default if the new debt is significant.
3Using LIHTC resources on permanently affordable 
housing projects would increase the number of lower 
income households across generations served by the 
LIHTC program and concurrently retain the public’s 
investment in affordable housing. Through LIHTC 
rental housing, the PAH sector can meet the needs of 
low-income households. At year 15, the PAH stewards 
would assess community needs and determine if 
LIHTC units should remain as permanently affordable 
rentals or be converted to permanently affordable 
owner-occupied housing using one of the shared 
equity homeownership models. 
The LIHTC program can provide an important and 
substantial source of funding for the PAH sector, 
particularly since financing affordable housing has 
become more challenging during the economic 
recession. While some PAH organizations have 
effectively used LIHTC to increase the supply of 
permanently affordable housing in their communities,7 
LIHTC deals are extremely complex. Smaller 
organizations often lack the capacity and technical 
expertise to put together project financing, undertake 
compliance reporting, and manage rental properties. 
Organizations without tax credit or rental management 
experience may build capacity through collaboration 
with an experienced tax credit project developer. 
7 CLTs that have completed LIHTC projects include the Athens Land Trust, 
California Community Foundation Land Trust, Champlain Housing Trust, 
Irvine CLT, Mountainlands Community Housing Trust, NeighborWorks Black-
stone River Valley, Sawmill Land Trust, Tenants to Homeowners, Inc., Thistle 
Communities, and Women’s Community Revitalization Project.
Directing Tax Credit Allocations 
through the QAP
The Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) is a policy tool that 
establishes the state’s housing priorities and specifies 
the criteria used to select tax credit projects. State 
agencies “score” competing projects, awarding points 
to projects with characteristics outlined in the QAP.8  
Because the supply of credits is limited, the allocation 
process is highly competitive under normal market 
conditions, and the QAP exerts strong influence on the 
character of LIHTC housing produced. 
States typically use three mechanisms to guide the 
allocation of tax credits—threshold requirements, set-
asides and point-based scoring criteria.
•	 Threshold	requirements	set minimum standards 
for LIHTC projects.  Only developments meeting 
the threshold requirements are eligible to receive 
credits.
•	 Set-asides	are funds from a state’s tax credit 
allocation pool dedicated to specific types of 
projects. 
•	 Point-based	scoring	criteria are used to rank 
qualifying development proposals based on state 
affordable housing priorities. HFAs award extra 
points to projects with desired characteristics.
8 Gustafson, Jeremy and Walker, Christopher. 2002, May. Analysis of State 
Qualified Allocation Plans for the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program.  
US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and 
Development Research.  Retrieved March 5, 2012: http://www.huduser.
org/portal/publications/hsgfin/analysis_of_sqa_plans.html.
Year 30Year 15Year 10
Placed in Service,
Year 1
Owner can opt out 
through Qualified 
Contract Process
Tax Credit Use Period
Extended Affordability Period
Monitoring and Enforcement by State HFA Only
Initial Affordability Period
Compliance and Recapture Period; Monitoring by IRS and HFA
Figure 1: LIHTC Timeline
4Mechanism # of States % of States States
Total 51 100%
Threshhold Requirements 13 25% CA, ME, MD, MN, NH, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, WI
Points 24 47% AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, LA, 
MT, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OK, TN, TX, WV, WY
Threshold and Points 9 18% KS, MA, MI, MS, NV, ND, SC, SD, WA
None 5 10% AZ, IN, KY, MO, VA
Table 1: How States Incentivize Extended Affordability
The QAP is a state-wide document and must 
incorporate elements that encourage developers to 
meet the diverse housing needs of rural, suburban 
and urban areas. In this way, HFAs often include a 
number of requirements and selection criteria in their 
QAPs that may contradict or work against others. For 
instance, a QAP may award points to large multifamily 
projects consisting of at least 50 units and to projects 
that intend to convert to tenant ownership.  However, 
homeownership conversions may only be permissible 
in developments consisting of single-family homes, 
duplexes and townhomes.  In these cases, HFAs must 
balance competing criteria and developers must 
carefully consider their application as a whole in order 
to decide which points they want to pursue in order to 
be competitive. 
Drawing on an analysis of the QAPs for all fifty states 
and Washington DC,9  this report identifies policies 
and preferences states have adopted to guide the 
allocation of LIHTC resources that may support PAH.  
Although no HFAs currently use LIHTC set-asides or 
points for PAH tax credit applicants, we focus on two 
categories of preferences that can favor the PAH 
sector: extended affordability periods and conversion 
to tenant ownership.
Incentivizing PAH through Extended 
Affordability
Extended periods of affordability required or 
incentivized by HFAs in their QAPs align well with the 
PAH sector’s provision of affordability in perpetuity. 
Many states provide incentives or require developers 
9 We analyzed the most recent version of each QAP available.  Depending 
on the state and their application timeline, the versions dated from 2011 
to 2013.  
to commit to a 30-year extended affordability period, 
and a smaller number of states encourage or require 
developers to ensure affordability for more than 30 
years.  Because of their missions and track records, 
PAH organizations are uniquely positioned to increase 
the competitiveness of their LIHTC application by 
committing to extended affordability periods.  
Thirteen states require LIHTC applications to extend 
affordability beyond the 15-year compliance period 
to be eligible to receive tax credits (Table 1).  Almost 
twice as many states (24) incentivize extended 
affordability periods through the allocation of points.  
Nine states both require affordability restrictions 
beyond the 15-year compliance period and reward 
applications that go beyond the threshold requirement 
with points.  Five states do none of the above.  In 
these states, developers are still expected to satisfy 
the federal extended affordability period but the 
QAPs do not reinforce or strengthen this program 
requirement.
 
Of the 13 states that require extended affordability 
periods as part of their threshold requirements, 
9 mandate that LIHTC applications commit to 
maintaining affordability for a minimum of 30 years 
(Table 2).  The remaining 4 states require applications 
to exceed the federal minimum.  While no state 
specifically requires extended affordability through 
PAH models, New Hampshire and Utah mandate LIHTC 
project affordability in perpetuity.  New Hampshire 
allows for an opt-out in year 30 but the complex and 
onerous exit process discourages property owners 
from leaving the program. 
5Several states use a combination of threshold 
requirements and point incentives to encourage long-
term affordability (Table 3).  All of these states require 
that LIHTC applications meet a minimum threshold 
of 30 years of affordability and then provide points 
to incentivize an even longer-term commitment.  
Massachusetts, for example, requires that developers 
ensure affordability for 30 years and their QAP awards 
3 points (or 1.6% of the total point allocation) for 50 
additional years of affordability and 6 points (or 3.3% 
of the total points) for a guarantee of affordability in 
perpetuity. 
The most popular way that HFAs extend project 
affordability beyond the 15-year compliance period 
is to exclusively offer point incentives with nearly 
half of states (47%) using this mechanism (Table 4).  
Four states offer points to applications that extend 
affordability for less than the federal minimum 
standard. While not ideal, this acknowledges that 
developers likely need incentives to meet program 
guidelines and not opt-out in year 15.   Fifteen of 
the 24 states (29%) encourage longer affordability 
restrictions with the vast majority (11 states) 
incentivizing affordability for more than 40 years.  
Point incentives vary by the length of affordability 
restrictions they encourage and by the weight they 
carry in the overall QAP application score (Table 5).  Of 
the 33 states that offer point incentives (alone or in 
conjunction with threshold requirements) almost half 
(16) allocate only a small percentage of total points to 
projects that extend affordability periods.  Given the 
extremely competitive nature of tax credit  allocations, 
however, even small point incentives can make a 
difference.
As the PAH sector ensures affordability in perpetuity, 
these points offer a natural opportunity to increase 
application competitiveness.  As described above, PAH 
organizations may increase their capacity and LIHTC 
competitiveness by partnering with an experienced 
tax credit project developer.  Such a partnership, 
however, should be advantageous to both groups.  
A PAH organization’s ability to satisfy extended 
affordability requirements or incentives makes them 
an attractive partner in a LIHTC project.  Because PAH 
organizations produce high-quality housing that is built 
to last, however, they may be penalized for higher 
per unit construction costs. State HFAs should find 
ways to formally value high quality construction and 
permanent affordability as long-term investments that 
justify higher construction costs.
# of States % of States States
Threshhold and Points 9 18% KS, MA, MI, MS, NV, ND, SC, SD, WA
30 years 2 4% KS, ND**
31-40 years 2 4% SC, WA
41-62 years 4 8% MI, MS, NV, SD
99+ years 1 2% MA
**KS and ND offer points to incentivize that projects meet the 30-year threshold period.
Table 3: Length of Extended Affordability Periods for States that use Thresholds and Points
# of States % of States States
Threshhold Requirements 13 26% CA, ME, MD, MN, NH, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, WI
30 years 9 18% ME, MN, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WI
31-40 years 1 2% MD
41-62 years 1 2% CA
99+ years 2 4% NH, UT
Table 2: Length of Extended Affordability Thresholds by State
6Conversion of LIHTC Rentals to 
Shared Equity Homeownership
Though generally thought of as a rental program, 
LIHTC rules allow for the conversion of rental units to 
tenant ownership, enabling states to use tax credits 
as a tool to promote homeownership. Although no 
HFAs expressly encourage conversion to shared equity 
homeownership, HFAs could promote the expansion 
of this homeownership model to ensure long-term 
affordability and retention of public funding. 
To encourage shared equity homeownership, LIHTC 
projects can be structured up-front as lease-purchase 
programs, whereby tenants may purchase their 
units with resale restrictions in year 15.10  While 
some housing advocates consider the 15-year lease-
purchase tenancy period too long for most potential 
homebuyers, the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN), 
which operates one of the largest and most successful 
lease-purchase programs financed with LIHTC, has 
maintained a strong renter-to-owner conversion rate.11 
10 LIHTC units sold to tenants are released from the additional 15-year 
extended use period.
11 Immergluck, Dan and Schaeffing, Philip. 2010, October 12. Responsible 
Lease-Purchase: A Review of the Practice and Research Literature on Non-
Alternatively, an organization can structure their 
LIHTC properties as conventional rentals, offering 
all or a portion for lease-purchase or shared equity 
homeownership in year 15.  This approach provides 
the flexibility to develop a housing strategy that meets 
the changing needs of existing residents and the 
broader community.12  Given that most LIHTC projects 
are multifamily developments, which may not lend 
themselves to homeownership, it can be difficult to 
convert LIHTC units that were not originally intended 
for lease-purchase. Additionally, some states restrict 
LIHTC conversions, only allowing scattered site single-
family, duplex or townhome units to be transferred to 
homeownership.
While lease-purchase programs offer a creative way 
to use the LIHTC program to support shared equity 
homeownership, these programs are complex to 
develop and administer.13  Structuring and managing 
the financing within the LIHTC program is difficult, 
profit Programs. Retrieved October 2, 2012: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691194.
12 NeighborWorks America, 2012, June. Scattered Site Rental Toolkit: Busi-
ness Planning for Development & Management.  Retrieved August 2, 2012: 
http://www.stablecommunities.org/ssr/0/SSR_Index.htm.
13 See NeighborWorks (2012) and Immergluck and Schaeffing (2010) for 
more on the advantages and challenges of lease purchase programs.
# of States % of States States
Total 24 47% AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, LA, MT, 
NE, NJ, NM, NY, OK, TN, TX, WV, WY
Less than 30 years 4 8% AL, AR, GA, TN
30 years 5 10% AK, DE, IA, NY, WV
31-40 years 4 8% CO, LA, OK, TX
41-62 years 11 21% CT, DC, HI, ID, IL, MT, NE, NJ, NM, WY, FL
Table 4: Length of Extended Affordability Periods for States that use Only Points
Strength of Point Incentive # of States % of States States
Total 33 100%
AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, KS, 
LA, MA, MI, MS, MT, ND, NE, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OK, 
SC, SD, TN, TX, WA, WV, WY
Strong 
(> 10% of total points)
7 21% CO, HI, ID, NJ, NY, WA, WV
Moderate 
(5%-10% of total points)
10 30% FL, IA, MT, NM, ND, OK, SC, SD, TN, WY
Weak 
(< 5% of total points)
16 49%
AL, AK, AR, CT, DC, DE, GA, IL, KS, LA, MA, MI, MS, 
NE, NV, TX
Table 5: Strength of Point Incentives for Extended Affordability
7requiring capacity that non-profits may not have. 
However, shared equity homeownership programs 
do have the stewardship capacity to provide resident 
education, counseling, and ongoing support, which are 
crucial for the success of lease-purchase programs.  
Most states (44) incentivize LIHTC projects that 
provide homeownership opportunities to tenants after 
the 15-year compliance period (Table 6).  Eight states 
explicitly offer conversion to homeownership as an 
alternative to the 15-year extended use agreement.  
In these states, developers can either opt to abide 
by affordability restrictions for a full 30 years or offer 
homeownership opportunities to existing residents in 
year 15 in order to meet threshold requirements.  
Only one state, Utah, sets aside funds specifically for 
projects that encourage eventual homeownership.  
Utah allocates five percent of tax credits to projects 
sponsored by government and non-profit developers 
that offer homeownership opportunities to tenants 
after the 15-year compliance period.  While four 
states favor projects that encourage eventual 
homeownership when application scores result in a 
tie, most states (67%) incentivize conversion to tenant 
ownership through points.
Sixty-eight percent of states that incentivize eventual 
tenant ownership through points offer less than 5% 
of the total point allocation for this purpose (Table 
7).  Twenty nine percent offer between 5 and 10% of 
the points, and Colorado is the only state that deeply 
incentivizes tenant ownership by allocating 
more than a quarter (26%) of its total point allocation 
to applicants who promise to offer homeownership 
opportunities in year 15. 
QAPs provide various levels of detail to explain what 
a transition to tenant ownership entails.  Several 
states, including Florida and Tennessee, require 
Incentive Mechanism # of States % of States States
Total 44 86%
AL, AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, 
IL, IN, LA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, MT, NC, 
ND, NE, NJ, NV, OH, OK, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, 
VT, WA, WI, WV
Threshold Requirements 8 16% CA, KS, MD, MS, OH, PA, RI, SD
Set-Asides 1 2% UT
Points 34 67%
AK, AR, AZ, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IN, KS, LA, 
ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, NJ, NM, NY, OK, SC, 
SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI
Tie Breakers 4 8% AL, IL, NC, VT
None 7 14 MA, NH, NM, NY, OR, VA, WY
Table 6: How States Incentivize Transitions to Tenant Ownership
Strength of Point Incentive # of States % of States States
Total 34 100%
AK, AZ, AR, CT, CO, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, UN, 
KS, LA, ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, NJ, NM, NY 
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI
Strong 
(> 10% of total points)
1 3% CO
Moderate 
(5%-10% of total points)
10 29% DC, FL, IA, LA, MS, MT, NJ, ND, OK, SC
Weak 
(< 5% of total points)
23 68% AK, AZ, AR, CT, DE, GA, HI, ID, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, 
NE, NM, NY, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI
Table 7: Strength of Point Incentives for Transitions to Tenant Ownership
8homeownership plans, homeownership counseling, 
down payment savings accounts and/or details on 
purchase prices. PAH organizations are uniquely 
positioned to score well in this category given their 
stewardship capacity and experience with providing 
successful homeownership opportunities for low-
income households.14   
Conclusion
The existing requirements and incentives that 
favor extended affordability and homeownership 
opportunities in state QAPs suggest significant 
potential for the PAH sector to utilize the LIHTC 
program as a tool to increase the production of 
permanently affordable rental and owner-occupied 
housing while maximizing the public’s investment.  
However, the decision to undertake a LIHTC project 
requires careful consideration.  Given the complexity 
of LIHTC deals, and the expertise and capacity they 
require, organizations without tax credit or rental 
management experience should work with an 
experienced development partner.
HFAs can enhance LIHTC investment in the PAH sector. 
HFAs draft QAPs annually providing advocates with 
an opportunity to influence priorities for the LIHTC 
program.  During the QAP review and comment 
period, advocates can:
• educate HFAs about the benefits of PAH both 
in terms of supporting low-income households 
and preserving limited government subsidies. 
Organizations should emphasize that while PAH 
units may cost more up front, they tend to cost 
less per household over the long term;
• recommend a set aside for non-profit 
organizations committed to permanent 
affordability and ongoing stewardship;
• encourage HFAs to require “waiver of qualified 
contract” language which prohibits developers 
from opting out of the LIHTC program in year 15;
 
14 According to a survey of CLTs, more than half (55%) of respondents 
reported serving households earning 80% or less of AMI (Thaden, Emily. 
2012, January 11.  Results of the 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey.  The 
Housing Fund, Vanderbilt University in conjunction with the National Com-
munity Land Trust Network and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy  Retrieved 
April 26, 2012: http://www.cltnetwork.org/Resources/2011-Comprehen-
sive-CLT-Survey).
• recommend more detailed  language around 
lease-purchase programs that highlight and 
reward the stewardship components that PAH 
organizations already have in place;
• encourage partnerships between tax credit project 
developers and organizations committed to 
permanent affordability and stewardship.
9LIHTC Resources
Enterprise Community Investment’s guide to LIHTC:
http://www.enterprisecommunity.com/financing-and-
development/low-income-housing-tax-credits
HUD LIHTC Basics: http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/
affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/basics
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